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The behaviours of citizens during bushfires may 
determine whether they live or die. Using 100 citizen 
witness statements from the 2009 Australian bushfires, 
we show how people react to bushfire smoke. Eighty-
nine witnesses expressly mention smoke, not 
necessarily in combination with fire. This prompted 
behaviours including: seeking further information, 
monitoring the situation, effecting a fire plan 
(including evacuation), alerting people to danger and 
fire risk, and going home. Computational simulators 
have been used to assess civilians’ risk and to help 
with evacuation efforts. Despite works that accurately 
model fire spread and people’s behaviours in response 
to perceiving fire, the issue of how people react to 
seeing smoke from a bushfire is rarely considered. We 
discuss how the identified behaviours may be 
incorporated into an agent-based simulator of 
bushfire.  
1. Introduction  
The recent Australian bushfires in 2019/2020 
were the worst on record, with 46 million acres of 
forest and farmland burned, more than one billion 
animals killed, thousands of buildings, including 
homes, destroyed, and at least 34 lives lost [1] [2]. In 
the early 1990s, the state of Victoria in Australia 
adopted the bushfire response policy for civilians to 
‘prepare, stay and defend’ or ‘prepare and leave early’; 
known colloquially as the ‘Stay or Go’ policy [3]. 
However, since the 2009 bushfires the guidelines have 
been updated and people are now encouraged to leave 
before the bushfire threatens [4]. In a recent study, 
Whittaker reported that since the 2009 bushfires the 
percentage of householders that planned to leave when 
threatened by a bushfire had risen from 24% to 26-
65% [5]. This puts increasing pressure to manage 
evacuation of the population in a safe and speedy 
manner. 
Evacuation poses a huge problem for emergency 
managers since they need to ensure that there are a 
sufficient number of routes out of the danger zone, and 
that they are safe from fallen trees and embers. In 
addition, the potentially large number of evacuees 
means that road congestion can soon become a 
problem. Therefore, controlled evacuation, with 
certain zones being evacuated before others, may be 
practiced. Evacuation relies on the public knowing of 
the danger and being ready to evacuate. Hence, it is 
important to carefully schedule warning, alerts, and 
evacuation messages and to make sure that they are 
accurate [6] [7].   
Large scale evacuation exercises are difficult, 
costly and often impractical to organise. Therefore, 
computer simulation of evacuation has become a 
useful tool. Such simulators often employ a 
geographical information system (GIS) to model the 
distribution of households in the environment as well 
as the transport network. Other components, such as 
the fuel load of the environment (trees, shrubland, 
clear areas, etc.) are also included. An important 
component of the simulator is the fire model. One of 
the first considerations is the area that the fire model 
covers, from small scale such as a few buildings, to 
larger scale models covering hundreds of kilometers. 
In this work, we are only concerned with the latter. 
Many fire models can predict the rate of fire spread 
and its direction. Meteorological information, such as 
wind speed and direction, and differences in 
vegetation and terrain, are also often included [8] [9] 
[10] [11] [12] [13]. Smoke generation from the fire is 
accounted for and complex smoke models exist that 
can be incorporated into fire models [14]. Despite 
these impressive works, the effect of smoke on citizens 
and in particular how people behave in the face of 
smoke has received less attention. We argue that 
smoke, even in the absence of fire, is a trigger for some 





human behaviours and that these should be 
incorporated into computational models of evacuation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
covers related work on how human behaviours 
regarding smoke are modelled in evacuation 
simulators. Section 3 describes our study method, 
whilst section 4 describes the results of our analysis. 
The implications of the results for developing bushfire 
evacuation simulators are discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the 
main findings and a description of future work.  
2. Previous work 
Early works on evacuation modelling mainly used 
a macro approach employing mathematical equations 
to simulate the demand load on roads and calculate the 
average origin-to-destination times [15] [16]. The 
problem with such macro models is that they track 
masses as a whole and make unrealistic assumptions 
regarding individuals’ behaviours [17]. To overcome 
this an agent-based micro simulation approach has 
become popular. An agent is a computational entity 
capable of autonomous behaviour. It is able to take 
information from its environment, make its own 
decisions and act accordingly. The use of agents in 
modelling human systems has several advantages over 
other approaches [18]. Firstly, agent-based systems 
are able to capture emergent phenomena, such as 
traffic jams. Secondly, they provide a natural 
description of a system, which as Bonabeau notes 
makes the approach much closer to reality. Finally, 
they are flexible, allowing us to study social systems 
at different levels of abstraction by varying the 
complexity of our agents or by aggregating agents into 
subgroups.  
In agent-based evacuation simulators, the agents 
represent people, groups of people, or more typically 
vehicles.  There are now many evacuation simulators 
for different types of emergencies and disasters that 
use an agent-based approach. Some works (for 
example [19], or [20]) place their efforts on accurately 
modelling the fire component using an agent-based 
approach, whilst ignoring the human element. Other 
works concentrate on emergency response operations 
to fighting the fire by modelling command and control 
behaviours of rescue personnel and their decision-
making process [21]. There have been some works that 
focus on the behaviour of citizens in the community 
during a bushfire. Investigating how people’s 
behaviours were affected by cognitive biases during 
 
1 Ethics approval was granted from the Chair of the Social and 
Interdisciplinary Human Research Ethics Committee (CSSHREC), 
CSIRO. Reference 095/20. 
bushfires, Arnaud developed an algorithmic 
formulation of how biases may be implemented in an 
agent-based simulator [22]. Mancheva and her 
colleagues, modelled the behaviours and 
communications of response personnel and citizens 
during an Australian bushfire [23]. Although citizens 
can perceive the fire and take protective actions, such 
as putting on protective clothing, checking their 
property for embers, and evacuating to a shelter, there 
are no actions linked to perceiving smoke. Likewise, 
Singh and Padgham developed an agent-based model 
for community evacuations with a realistic approach 
that uses residents’ beliefs, goals, and plans to drive 
agents’ behaviours [24]. In the simulation, residents 
are ordered to leave the area and drive to designated 
relief centres. Human behaviour in the model is based 
on real life, with some agents taking a while before 
acting on the evacuation order, and some driving to 
collect loved ones or picking up children from school. 
Nevertheless, the evacuation is triggered by an 
Incident Controller who runs the simulation; it does 
not take into account the mounting road congestion 
that may occur from people who decide to evacuate 
beforehand due to seeing the warning signs of smoke. 
Although many simulators accurately model how 
agents react to fire, by either sensing it in their 
perception range, or being informed of the fire danger 
from official communications, the models do not 
include any behaviours related to smoke. 
3. Method 
The work used as its basis the 100 lay witness 
statements1 that are included in Volume 4 of the 2009 
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission final report 
[25]. The statements were freely available on-line as 
separate files from the Bushfire Cooperative Research 
Centre until 2016.  
The transcripts vary in length from half a page to 
several pages. The transcripts were searched using the 
search string ‘smo’ to find references to smoke, as well 
as words such as ‘smoky’ and ‘smoldering’. Of the 
100 statements, 11 do not mention smoke or any of the 
associated words (see section 4.1 for a characterisation 
of those interviewees). We thus excluded these 11 
transcripts in looking for behaviours in the face of 
smoke.  
The actions following the sight or smell of smoke, 
or as a consequence of it being present, were then 
noted. Actions that were undertaken when fire or 
embers were also present were not noted since the 
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action could not be considered as a direct result of just 
the smoke. Of the 89 transcripts, a total of 672 
sentences mentioned the word smoke or its associates. 
Figure 1 gives the number of mentions of smoke per 
transcript, which shows that, as would be expected, 
smoke is a prominent aspect of the threat of, and 





Figure 1. Number of sentences regarding 
smoke per transcript. 
4. Results 
4.1. Characterisation of people not 
mentioning smoke 
Of the 100 statements, 89 people explicitly 
mention smoke, only 11 people do not mention smoke 











0 No  Lost many family 
members. Statement 
made to highlight 
support and services to 
bereaved families for 
the Royal Commission. 
6 No  Brother died in the 
fire. 
27 No  Lost partner who died 
while defending his 
property. 
33 No  Lost son, wife and 2 
grandchildren who died 
while trying to 
evacuate. 
75  Yes Nurse who worked in 
a makeshift medical 
facility (tent) to help 
victims. 
10  Yes CFA volunteer who 
helped to fight the fire. 
Lost aunt and uncle. 
Cousin’s property was 
totally destroyed. 
98  Yes Statement given as an 




99  Yes Statement given as an 
expert concerning 
community and fire 
safety issues. 
21 Yes  Planned to defend, was 
well equipped, and had 
a fire plan. However, 
he had never 
experienced a bushfire 
and evacuated as was 
overwhelmed by fire. 
The transcript does not 
detail his experience 
during the fire. 
69 Yes  House successfully 
defended, but the 
stables (occupation: 
horse breeder) and 
other buildings were 
destroyed, 10 horses 
died. 
71 Yes  Lost wife and son 
while evacuating. Wife 
and son returned home 
in a separate car and 
perished. 
 
In summary, of the 11 people who did not mention 
‘smoke’ in their statements, 4 were not directly 
involved in the fire, but had lost close family members; 
4 were involved from a professional point of view 
(fire-fighter, nurse, vegetation specialist, community 
resilience worker). Only 3 of the 11, shown by the grey 
cells in table 1, were directly involved in the fire. The 
above table shows that smoke is strong environmental 
cue and, as we will see in the next section, it evokes 
specific behaviours. 
4.2. Most common behaviours associated 
with smoke 
4.2.1. Seek information. Many people reported 




















Number of sentences regarding smoke 
per transcript
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regularly checking bushfire information websites 
throughout the danger period. However, the sight or 
smell of smoke often provoked an action to seek 
information, whether this was turning on the radio or 
calling friends, neighbours or relatives. 24 of the 89 
transcripts (27%) mentioned that smoke prompted 
them to search for information. In terms of the most 
popular sources of information, many turned to the 
County Fire Authority, CFA, websites (13 references 
to this source) or the radio (8 references to this source) 
when they saw smoke. Others either phoned their 
neighbours, friends, family, the local police station, 
the bushfire hotline, or consulted the Bureau of 
Meteorology website.  
Although many people turned to the radio or 
official websites for information, there are many 
criticisms concerning the lack of, or timeliness of 
information. This meant that some citizens relied on 
smoke to give them more accurate information: 
“During the day I was listening to the radio but 
from what I could see of the smoke around the valley 
the updates on the radio were always behind.” (Ref 
transcript 23) 
What may seem strange to us now is the lack of 
reference in the transcripts to any social media as a 
source of information. Social media, and in particular 
Twitter, has been used for many years for citizens to 
develop awareness of the unfolding situation [26] [27], 
coordinate support efforts [28], and provide and 
receive information from emergency management 
authorities [29], both during and after the disaster [30]. 
There is evidence that social media was used as a 
source of information on bushfires by newspapers [31] 
and radio stations. This includes ABC Radio 
Melbourne, the main radio station in the state where 
the fires were burning [32]. However, the low uptake 
of Twitter in the years leading up to and including 
2009 could explain its limited use. In their study 
Sinnappan and her colleagues found only 1684 tweets 
from 705 unique users as the bushfire events unfolded 
between the 6th and the 14th February, 2009 [32]. 
 
4.2.2. Monitor the situation. Smoke not only 
alerted people to danger, but was used to monitor the 
ongoing situation. From the 89 transcripts, 56 (63%) 
describe an activity that can be interpreted as using 
smoke to monitor the situation. Examples from the 
transcripts that show this are as follows: 
“I went in and out of the house all day checking 
for any signs of fire, particularly smoke.” (Ref 
transcript 2). 
“By watching the smoke, which was clearly visible 
from my home, I kept close tabs on where the fire was 
burning and it was growing each day.” (Ref transcript 
11). 
“We continued to monitor the smoke.” (Ref 
transcript 40). 
“On such days our routine is to observe the 
countryside from various viewpoints, look up to the 
mountains, monitor where the wind is blowing from 
and just watch out for smoke.” (Ref transcript 74). 
It was clear from the transcripts that citizens as 
well as the CFA were frequently using the sighting of 
smoke to indicate the location of the fire. As a CFA 
officer notes: 
“We were reliant on visual observations of the 
smoke plume for our information of the passage of the 
fire and on telephone calls to the observers at the 
Kangaroo Ground Tower, who said they had limited 
visibility due to the smoke.” (Ref transcript 40). 
What is also interesting is that people frequently 
commented on the form or colour of the smoke and it 
was clear that this was used as an indicator of the 
location of the fire, or how the fire was progressing. 
Out of the 89 transcripts 49 (55%) mentioned the 
colour, density or form of the smoke. 
“I went back outside to check it again and I saw 
that the smoke had become thicker. Again, the smoke 
was still not within breathing distance, but it was no 
more than one kilometre away.” (Ref transcript 2). 
“I observed that the smoke column was 
continually growing and getting darker in colour – a 
sure sign that the fire was hot.” (Ref transcript 40). 
“At that point we looked up and saw a big black 
cloud of smoke coming, which was different to what 
we had seen coming over from Kilmore.” (Ref 
transcript 23). 
A small minority of people, 4 out of the 89, said 
that upon seeing the smoke they moved to a position 
by car to get a better look. Sometimes this was to 
monitor the situation more closely, and sometimes this 
was just out of curiosity. 
 
4.2.3. Effect fire plan (Evacuate or Prepare and 
Defend). In 2009 Australian state and territory fire 
authorities advised citizens either to ‘stay and defend’ 
or ‘leave early’. To practically implement this policy, 
the CFA of Victoria advised citizens to prepare a fire 
plan in advance of the fire season and that the plan 
should be written down and well-practised. For the 
2009 bushfires, half the population that responded to a 
survey said that they intended to stay and defend, 
while only 21% intended to leave, 26% people tended 
to adopt a wait and see approach [5]. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious behaviours 
prompted by seeing or smelling smoke in the 
transcripts was to instigate a fire plan. Seeing both 
smoke and fire is a clear indicator that there is danger. 
However, if we consider those respondents who 
reacted to smoke alone, 23 of the 89 respondents 
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(26%) were prompted to implement their fire plan. 
However, several points should be taken into account. 
The first is that people had often been monitoring the 
fire-risk situation for several hours, in some cases 
days, via news outlets and websites. This meant that 
they were already alert to the danger and the possible 
risks. The second is how long it took people to start 
implementing their plan upon the first sighting of 
smoke. Some respondents clearly reacted 
immediately: 
“As soon as we saw smoke, we prepared the fire 
pump and got out our other smaller pieces of 
equipment such as mops, buckets and our fire box.” 
(Ref transcript 48). 
Whilst others monitored the smoke and waited 
until it came closer or changed in density or colour. In 
the following excerpt smoke was noticed at 3.30pm, 
but the respondents waited one and a half hour before 
starting the garden sprinklers, and only got the large 
fire hose out two and a half hours after the first 
sighting and when the smoke became dense and fast-
moving:  
“At around 3.30 pm, I noticed smoke from a big 
fire far to the South-West, approximately 30-40 km 
away….The smoke was a huge mushroom cloud, it 
looked like a nuclear bomb had just gone off but it was 
a long way away. By 5.00 pm however, it seemed 
closer so we decided to start soaking the sides of the 
house using the garden sprinklers…By 6.00 pm there 
were heavy fast-moving rolling palls of smoke in the 
sky so I laid out the big fire hose.” (Ref transcript 77). 
Some of the respondents had a plan to evacuate 
immediately, while others waited to see what would 
happen. 10 respondents evacuated in response to 
seeing smoke, with no sightings of fire. Some 
evacuated immediately, for example: 
“I could not hear anything but I could smell the 
smoke. It was about 6:20pm when we drove out of our 
driveway with our two dogs and headed into 
Traralgon.” (Ref transcript 17). 
Others were obviously caught out and had waited 
too long before evacuation. Although, there was still 
no sightings of fire, the smoke in itself had become 
dangerous and promoted evacuation, for example: 
“I couldn't see any flames at that stage but the 
smoke and embers were so thick that it was obvious 
that the fire had hit the surrounding bush.” (Ref 
transcript 79). 
As we see from the above example, the decision 
to evacuate was not just prompted by smoke but also 
by seeing embers and often the sound of the fire. For 
those that evacuated late, what is clear from the 
descriptions in the transcripts is that visibility during 
evacuation was greatly affected. Many respondents 
reported that the sky was black and that they had 
problems seeing. This undoubtedly affected the speed 
of evacuation. 
“He said both sides of the road were burning and 
the smoke was so thick that he couldn't see past the 
bonnet of his car and burning branches were hitting 
his car and that he was full of fear.” (Ref transcript 
12). 
“The smoke was like really thick fog. It was 
difficult to read the road signs and people were 
panicking, with cars heading in different directions” 
(Ref transcript 4). 
 
4.2.4. Alerting people to danger and to the fire 
risk. On seeing or smelling smoke the majority of 
people were alerted to danger, as the following 
examples show: 
“Even though the smoke was coming from 
Kilmore, we realized it was a threat to our property.” 
(Ref transcript 61). 
“Late in the afternoon, I went out into our 
backyard and I noticed some grey-white smoke off in 
the distance […..]. My immediate thought was that 
Marion would need to stay inside and I cautioned her 
to do so.” (Ref transcript 2). 
This warning to the fire risk did not necessarily 
come from seeing smoke alone but was often in 
association with other factors, such as earlier news 
broadcasts or the prolonged extremely hot weather.  
Nevertheless, 14 people (16%) did not consider 
that smoke indicated a danger or was an immediate 
precursor to fire. This was either due to previous 
experience where smoke had been seen in the past but 
there was no immediate danger of fire, or because 
people thought that it was a controlled burning 
exercise. The following comments show these points: 
“I wasn't panicking at all at this stage because I 
had smelt smoke during a previous fire that burned 
near Malmsbury and that fire never got anywhere near 
us.” (Ref transcript 96). 
“Even when I saw that smoke I was concerned but 
not alarmed – we had seen smoke in the sky in previous 
years from various distant fires.” (Ref transcript 87). 
“Although there was some smoke in the air, I 
thought it was a burn off.” (Ref transcript 49). 
 
4.2.5. Go home. Since the 7th February was a 
Saturday, the majority of respondents were at home 
when the bushfires occurred. Some people however 
were at work, shopping, or out visiting friends, etc. 
Upon seeing the smoke 9 of the 89 respondents (10%) 
decided to go home as the examples below show:  
“I told her I was going to go home because I was 
a bit worried about the smoke that I could see in the 
distance.” (Ref transcript 52) 
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“I immediately went home and at about 3.45pm, I 
took a photo from my veranda of the horizon obscured 
by smoke.” (Ref transcript 82) 
It should be noted that the majority of these people 
had a fire plan that involved defending their home. 
 
5. Implications for modelling and 
simulation  
Although the above activities can be taken into 
account in models of human behaviours in bushfire 
events, it is first important to consider to what level 
human behaviours should be modelled. That is, 
whether human activities should be modelled at a 
finely grained level, such as individual 
communications when searching for information, or at 
a coarser grain, such as general evacuation. Low level 
behaviours, such as searching for information, calling 
friends and family, etc. can have a significant impact 
on evacuation time if we consider the cumulative time 
taken for these activities [33]. A clear assumption in 
human behaviour models of bushfire evacuation is that 
upon receiving an evacuation order, people will 
immediately start to evacuate. From the transcripts, 
this is clearly not the case. People perform a plethora 
of activities (collecting belongings and pets, 
telephoning others, packing the car, etc.) before they 
evacuate. The time taken for these pre-evacuation 
behaviours is rarely taken into account in fire 
evacuation simulators. Although it can be hard to 
gauge how long people spend on average performing 
these activities, some work has been done in the area. 
Based on field studies and a literature search, Bangate 
identified, modelled and simulated 37 individual pre-
evacuation human behaviours, each with timing 
intervals, in the case of earthquakes [33]. The duration 
of these activities was used to estimate the delay 
before actual evacuation occurred.  
Evacuation models also assume perfect visibility 
during evacuation. From the preponderance of 
transcripts that describe the difficulty of people to see 
others, objects, signs, etc. due to the smoke, it is 
evident that evacuation speed is greatly reduced when 
high density smoke is present. A consequence of this 
for simulation is to reduce the travel speed depending 
on the density of the smoke as predicted by smoke 
models. Although there have been studies that look at 
how individuals walking speeds are affected by smoke 
during evacuation, e.g. [34], there are few works that 
look at how people drive in smoke-filled areas. 
Driving in smoke has been liked to driving in fog and 
indeed the two are often treated equally in transport 
studies [35]. In order to incorporate the effect of smoke 
on driving, it is necessary to assess how speed varies 
according to smoke and then to calibrate the vehicle 
speed in the simulator. In a simulated experiment Yan 
and his colleagues looked at how driver speed was 
affected by different densities of fog (no fog, light, and 
heavy) and gave speeds for each density for various 
types of road [36]. A study that looks specifically at 
car driving behaviour in smoke during evacuation in a 
bushfire was undertaken by Wetterberg. By employing 
virtual reality, he asked participants to drive in an ad 
hoc wildfire evacuation scenario. From his results a 
regression model, which related the speed with the 
smoke density, was developed [37].  Given that both 
of the above studies use virtual reality, it cannot be 
assumed that the drivers experience the same risk 
perception and levels of stress as they would have in 
real life. Nevertheless, these works do give us a 
starting point in calibrating car speed in the face of 
smoke.  
Although increasing numbers of people intend to 
evacuate, many will stay to defend their homes and 
livelihoods, or return to elderly or dependent relatives. 
After the 2009 bushfires, the fire danger ratings that 
are available to the public to show the fire risk in their 
area were revised. Two new categories were 
introduced by the New South Wales government: 
severe and catastrophic [38]. The highest category, 
catastrophic, advises that for survival, leaving is the 
only option. Despite this, a recent study found that 
even now 10 to 34% still plan to stay and defend [5]. 
If these people are away from their homes then they 
will return and start their defense fire plan. In terms of 
modelling and simulation, we cannot assume that all 
citizens will necessarily evacuate and that, taking a 
conservative figure, 10% will try to return to their 
homes. Some will be stopped by road blocks but others 
will attempt to bypass them and use unofficial 
backroads to get home [39].  
There is clear evidence that people use smoke as: 
an alert to danger, to seek further information, to 
monitor the situation, to trigger a fire plan, or to go 
home. However, there are some people (16% in the 
transcripts) who will not react to sightings of smoke. 
With the predicted increase in extreme bushfires due 
to climate change estimated to rise by 30% by 2017 
[40] fires will become more common and people may 
become increasingly complacent in their response to 
seeing smoke. This may be exacerbated by the 
increase in prescribed controlled burning, which has 
risen since 2004 [41]. Although we may think that an 
increase in the number of bushfires may increase 
people’s awareness of bushfire risk and so result in 
them being more responsive to sightings of smoke, this 
is not necessarily the case. Indeed, even after the 
bushfires of 2009, people still have a limited 
awareness of bushfire risk [5] and there is no clear 
Page 2231
relationship between increased risk perception and 
taking action [42]. This would imply that a percentage 
of the population will continue not to react to smoke. 
In terms of modelling and simulation this means that a 
percentage of the people modelled cannot be assumed 
to take actions when faced with smoke. From the 
transcripts, this was 16%.  
6. Conclusion  
The number and severity of bushfires is estimated 
to increase in the coming years due to climate change. 
Effective evacuation therefore becomes a critical 
issue, which has been aided by computer simulations 
that can assess different strategies and policies. It is 
now recognised that human behaviours must be taken 
into account in such situations. However, how people 
react to bushfire smoke is rarely included in such 
simulations. Using empirical evidence, we have 
shown how smoke is an important factor that can 
trigger peoples behaviours. Six main behaviours were 
identified: seeking further information, monitoring the 
situation, effecting a fire plan (including evacuation), 
alerting people to danger and fire risk, and going 
home. We argue that in order to be more realistic, 
future computer simulation should take into account 
not only the perception of the fire, warnings, and 
evacuation order, but how people react to seeing or 
smelling smoke. 
The work has several limitations. Firstly, as 
qualitative research, the analysis of the transcripts was 
subjective. Although the authors have been working 
for many years in the areas of bushfires and qualitative 
research, the analysis may still be influenced by their 
personal perspectives. Secondly, the analysis concerns 
the fires that occurred on the 7th February 2009 in the 
state of Victoria. Although this was Australia’s worst 
bushfire disaster in terms of lives lost, these fires are 
not the most recent, nor the most wide-spread. 
Unfortunately, an analysis of the most recent fires in 
2019/2020 is still being conducted by the authorities 
and so no official reports are available. This meant that 
we had to base our work on the 2009 bushfires. 
Finally, the analysis only included what was actually 
written in the statements. Some people may have done 
certain actions, such as using smoke as a trigger for 
monitoring how the fire was evolving, but did not 
explicitly mention it in their statements. 
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